Siege, Hunger and Famine in Gaza
Part 4 of Is Israel Committing Genocide in Gaza?
Hunger as a policy decision
In the previous article, I argued that the reported death toll in Gaza does not, by itself, establish genocidal intent. Urban warfare, permissive targeting, disproportionate attacks, poor intelligence, and dangerous rules of engagement can all produce civilian deaths without the civilian population itself being the intended object of destruction.
Hunger presents a different kind of evidence. During important periods of the Gaza war, Israeli leaders made deliberate policy decisions affecting whether food, water, fuel, and humanitarian supplies entered the territory. We therefore have to ask what Israeli decision-makers intended to accomplish by placing pressure on the conditions in which civilians lived.
October 2023: the complete siege
On October 9, 2023, two days after Hamas and other armed groups attacked Israeli communities and military positions and took hostages, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced a complete siege of Gaza. He was explicit: no electricity, no food, and no fuel. Whatever Gallant meant by his accompanying reference to “human animals,” the siege itself necessarily affected civilians. More than two million people lived in Gaza, and food, drinking water, electricity, and fuel could not be withheld only from Hamas fighters.
Within days, Israel began restoring or permitting limited access to some necessities. A water connection to southern Gaza was restored. On October 21, the first limited aid convoy entered through Rafah.
The initial convoy contained only twenty trucks, a tiny fraction of the volume Gaza had received before the war. Fuel remained heavily restricted, and humanitarian organizations repeatedly warned that the amount entering was nowhere near sufficient. The initial complete siege had begun to give way to limited, uneven access, with civilians still exposed to severe shortages.
The 2024 famine warning and June reassessment
In March 2024, the IPC's Famine Review Committee projected that famine was imminent in North Gaza and Gaza governorates under the conditions it then considered most likely. During the following months, food deliveries to the north increased, and nutrition, water, and health assistance expanded.
Israel also cooperated with humanitarian pauses for the September 2024 polio vaccination campaign, which reached nearly 560,000 children. Fighting and the absence of assured pauses delayed the second round in northern Gaza until November.
When the committee reassessed conditions in June, it concluded that the available evidence did not indicate that famine was occurring. It also declined to endorse a separate assessment suggesting that famine had occurred in April because the supporting evidence was insufficient. The committee considered the Emergency (IPC Phase 4) classification plausible for all areas of Gaza, with famine still a risk if conditions deteriorated.
A ceasefire in January 2025 brought a sharp increase in humanitarian supplies. Israeli forces withdrew from parts of the Netzarim Corridor, and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians moved back into northern Gaza.
March 2025: Was the cutoff lawful because Gaza already had food?
On March 2, 2025, after the first phase of the ceasefire expired, Israel halted the entry of humanitarian and commercial supplies into Gaza. The prime minister’s office linked the decision to Hamas’s rejection of a proposed extension and the release of hostages. An Israeli official separately claimed that supplies brought in during the preceding six-week ceasefire could sustain Gaza for four to six months.
Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires an occupying power to accept and facilitate collective relief when all or part of the population is inadequately supplied. The ICRC’s updated 2025 commentary recognizes that if essential supplies are actually adequate, the occupying power is not automatically obliged to accept additional relief merely because it is offered.
Opposed to a common claim, nothing in Article 59 creates a fixed two-month exemption. Article 55 also obliges an occupying power to ensure basic food and medical supplies to the fullest extent of the means available to it. The existence of stocks at the start of a closure cannot answer whether families remained adequately supplied weeks later.
In its October 22, 2025 advisory opinion concerning UN and humanitarian activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, the International Court of Justice treated Israel’s occupation obligations as applicable to Gaza, found the population inadequately supplied on the record before it, and held that Israel was obliged to facilitate relief. The Court also emphasized that security concerns do not create a general right to suspend all humanitarian operations. This was an advisory opinion about humanitarian obligations, not a judgment that Israel had committed genocide.
How long did the food reserves last?
The World Food Program reported bringing more than 40,000 metric tons of food into Gaza over the 42-day ceasefire and assisting roughly 1.3 million people. OCHA reported that Food Security Sector partners had brought in more than 78,000 metric tons by March 1. Israeli authorities subsequently put the total food aid entering Gaza during the ceasefire at 338,676 metric tons. These figures cover different reporting systems and categories of deliveries.
The subsequent reports document shortages in some important distribution channels. On March 14, WFP said its remaining stocks would sustain its kitchens and bakeries for up to one month and provide a shorter period of food parcels to about 550,000 people. By March 31, all 25 WFP-supported bakeries had closed because flour and cooking fuel ran out. On April 25, WFP reported exhausting its remaining food stocks for families in Gaza. These figures reflect only what happened to WFP supplies, not to every private, commercial, or organizational reserve. In late March, OCHA also reported more than 89,000 metric tons of food waiting outside Gaza, while shops inside faced shortages and rising prices.
The closure ran from March 2 through May 18; limited aid entry resumed on May 19, after roughly 78 days. Israel said its revised distribution arrangements were intended to prevent Hamas from taking control of humanitarian supplies.
The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation became a major part of the aid system, while humanitarian organizations reported that the quantities entering remained insufficient. The Famine Review Committee subsequently documented reports of deaths and injuries among civilians seeking food at distribution sites.
The August 2025 IPC famine classification
On August 22, 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), following review by its Famine Review Committee, classified famine in Gaza Governorate for the July 1–August 15 period, using the category “Famine with reasonable evidence.” The finding applied to that governorate, rather than every resident of Gaza, and it was not a direct count of people who had died of starvation.
The famine framework normally examines three outcomes: extreme food insecurity, acute malnutrition, and mortality. The IPC judged the first two thresholds to have been met in Gaza Governorate. For malnutrition, it relied on mid-upper arm circumference, or MUAC, screenings rather than weight-for-height measurements. Under IPC rules, the famine threshold is 30 percent for weight-for-height but 15 percent for MUAC when there is also evidence that the underlying drivers of malnutrition are rapidly deteriorating. The IPC explains the lower numerical cutoff by noting that weight-for-height generally identifies about twice as many cases of acute malnutrition as MUAC. Its August 30 methodological explanation reported MUAC prevalence of 10.1 percent in the first half of July and 16.4 percent in the second half among screened children in Gaza Governorate.
The mortality element was less directly established. The Famine Review Committee acknowledged that representative mortality surveys were unavailable and that it had no direct measure proving the famine mortality threshold had been crossed. It instead inferred, from severe food insecurity, worsening child malnutrition, and incomplete death registration, that the required level of nutrition-related and illness-related mortality had probably been reached. The finding relied on the IPC's published “reasonable evidence” protocol rather than a direct measurement of every famine threshold.
Israel challenged the methodology; the IPC defended it
Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, or COGAT, disputed the August classification. It argued that the IPC had inadequately counted food deliveries and commercial supplies, relied on screening populations that were not representative, and inferred mortality without the required direct evidence. It also questioned the decision to emphasize the second half of July, when the measured MUAC prevalence exceeded the famine threshold, rather than the full-month weighted average of 12.5 percent. Israeli government material published in 2026 maintained these objections and called for withdrawal of the classification.
The IPC responded that MUAC has been an accepted famine indicator since 2019 and that community screening can be used when representative surveys are too dangerous. It argued that combining both halves of July would obscure a rapidly worsening trend, and it defended the use of indirect evidence for mortality under its reasonable-evidence protocol.
The Famine Review Committee reiterated its August conclusion in December 2025, and the classification remained in place.
What about Hamas stealing aid?
There is evidence of looting, diversion, criminal gangs, and breakdowns in distribution. Hamas governed Gaza and had incentives to control resources. According to Reuters, an internal USAID review of 156 reported losses or thefts involving U.S.-funded assistance from October 2023 to May 2025 found no evidence of systematic Hamas diversion in those incidents. U.S. and Israeli officials disputed its broader implications and cited other evidence, some of it not public.
The UN2720 aid-tracking system monitors humanitarian shipments handled through its mechanism, rather than every delivery entering Gaza. Its reports classify supplies as intercepted when they are taken during transit, whether peacefully by hungry civilians or forcibly by armed groups. Food collected directly from trucks may reach civilians, although it bypasses organized distribution and can leave vulnerable households without their intended supplies.
Armed seizures present a different problem, but even then, the food is not necessarily lost permanently. OCHA reported that after armed groups intercepted food trucks on June 25, 2025, humanitarian partners and community leaders recovered and distributed 51 percent of the diverted commodities.
Food could also enter Gaza without reaching the households that needed it. Humanitarian organizations had to collect shipments at crossings, move them along damaged and insecure roads, and distribute them amid military operations, fuel shortages, disrupted communications, looting, and governance collapse.
What the ICC warrants establish
In November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant concerning alleged conduct from October 2023 through May 2024. The judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both men bore criminal responsibility for starvation as a method of warfare, along with several crimes against humanity.
The Chamber also found reasonable grounds to believe that restrictions on food, water, electricity, fuel, and medical supplies had created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of Gaza's civilian population. It could not, however, determine that all elements of the separate crime against humanity of extermination had been established. These were findings at the arrest-warrant stage, not convictions.
The genocide question requires a further determination about intent. Deliberately depriving civilians of essential supplies to pressure Hamas, punish the population, or secure a military advantage can constitute a war crime without establishing an intention to destroy Palestinians as a protected group, in whole or in part. Evaluating that separate allegation requires evidence of the decisions, the statements of those responsible, and what they understood about the consequences for civilians.
What was Israel trying to accomplish? By March 2025, the population was dependent on outside supplies amid damage to agricultural production, water systems, and healthcare. Israel announced the cutoff as pressure on Hamas over a proposed ceasefire extension and the release of hostages, and it remained in place while humanitarian agencies reported dwindling stocks.
On May 18, Netanyahu's office announced that limited food deliveries would resume because preventing a hunger crisis was necessary for the expansion of its military campaign. The statements and the sequence support an inference that humanitarian access was being used as leverage in Israel's negotiations and military strategy.
Malnutrition and Birth Rates
According to OCHA, Gaza’s Ministry of Health documented 461 malnutrition-related deaths, including 157 children, between October 2023 and October 7, 2025. The reported toll rose sharply during the summer of 2025. On July 27, the World Health Organization reported that 63 of the 74 malnutrition-related deaths recorded that year had occurred in July alone. These are deaths recorded as malnutrition-related, a narrower measure than the mortality threshold used by the IPC, which also includes deaths from illnesses aggravated by inadequate nutrition.
The Famine Review Committee inferred from indirect evidence that the broader famine mortality threshold had been crossed in Gaza Governorate. No representative mortality survey established how many deaths were missing from the official count, and the size of any undercount remains unknown.
On the other hand, children continued to be born in Gaza throughout the war, a fact sometimes raised to challenge claims of widespread starvation. But the number of births tells us little about whether pregnant women were receiving adequate food or medical care. According to UNFPA, citing Gaza’s Ministry of Health, approximately 17,000 births were recorded between January and June 2025, compared with 29,000 during the same period in 2022, a decline of about 41 percent. UNFPA also reported that 5,560 newborns were premature, underweight, or required neonatal intensive care.
Most children born during the first half of 2025 were conceived before Israel suspended aid deliveries in March. Their births therefore tell us little about how that particular restriction affected conception, although conditions during pregnancy could still have affected maternal and infant health. A decline in recorded births is not necessarily equivalent to the same decline in the birth rate, since population changes and incomplete registration may affect the figures. Nor is continued childbirth a criterion for determining whether famine occurred.
Following the October 2025 ceasefire, increased humanitarian and commercial deliveries were accompanied by a marked improvement in Gaza’s food-security conditions. The IPC’s December assessment no longer classified any area as experiencing famine. It estimated that 104,000 people still faced Catastrophe (Phase 5) conditions and approximately 1.6 million remained in Crisis or worse during October and November. By its July 2026 assessment, covering April 16 through June 30, all five governorates were classified in Crisis (Phase 3), with no population assessed as facing Catastrophe. Approximately 1.2 million people remained in Crisis or worse, including 212,000 in Emergency (Phase 4).
Where the famine evidence leaves the genocide question
The question for this article is whether the restrictions on essential supplies demonstrate an intention to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, in whole or in part. I do not find that specific intent established by the famine evidence examined here. Israel's announced use of restrictions to pressure Hamas, its cooperation with some humanitarian measures, changes in aid access, and the improvement after the ceasefires all bear on its objectives. The evidence establishes coercive policies and serious consequences for civilians more clearly than it establishes an intention to physically destroy Palestinians as a group.
Displacement raises another set of questions about Israel's objectives. Evacuation orders, proposals for Palestinian emigration, and plans for military control of parts of Gaza require their own examination, particularly when determining whether the removal of civilians was intended to be temporary or permanent.
Source Guide — Primary Documents and Public Reporting
ICRC, Commentary (2025) on Fourth Geneva Convention Article 55: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-55/commentary/2025
ICRC, Commentary (2025) on Fourth Geneva Convention Article 59: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-59/commentary/2025
IPC, March 2024 Famine Review Committee report and projection: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156872
IPC, June 2024 Famine Review Committee reassessment: https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_Gaza_June2024.pdf
IPC, June 4, 2024 review of FEWS NET's April famine assessment: https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/documents/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_FEWS_NET_Gaza_4June2024.pdf
UN Commission of Inquiry, detailed findings concerning the October 7, 2023 attacks: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/coi-attacks-7october2023-report-10jun24/
ICJ, October 22, 2025 Advisory Opinion, Obligations of Israel in relation to United Nations and other organizations: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icj-advisory-opinion-22oct2025/
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, statement of March 2, 2025 (archived transcript): https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2025/03/mil-250302-israel-pm02.htm
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, May 18, 2025 food-aid statement (as reported by Reuters): https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-airstrike-kills-least-24-gaza-mediators-host-ceasefire-talks-2025-05-17/
WFP, March 14, 2025 stock and ceasefire reporting: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/earlier-food-security-gains-in-gaza-at-risk-food-insecurity-concerns-grow-in-west-bank/
OCHA, February 16–March 1, 2025 Food Security Sector reporting: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-16-february-1-march-2025
Israeli government, technical response citing ceasefire food tonnage (2026): https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/systematic-distortions-in-the-ipc-s-gaza-report-of-august-25/en/English_MISC_FINAL%20TABLE.pdf
OCHA, March 16–29, 2025 humanitarian response update: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-16-29-march-2025
WFP, April 25, 2025 remaining stocks exhausted: https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-runs-out-food-stocks-gaza-border-crossings-remain-closed
IPC, Famine Review Committee, August 2025; classification portal: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159696/
IPC, August 30, 2025 response to methodological questions: https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/Response_to_Issues_Raised_Following_IPC_Famine_Classification_in_the_Gaza_Strip.pdf
COGAT, August 22, 2025 response to IPC: https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/mfa-response-to-ipc-report-22-aug-2025/en/English_Swords_of_Iron_DOCUMENTS_COGAT_Humanitarian_Efforts_in_the_Gaza_Strip%E2%80%93Response_to_recent_IPC_publication-August_2025.pdf
Israel government, continuing technical objections (2026): https://govextra.gov.il/mda/ipc/gaza
OCHA, October 2025 reporting of 461 malnutrition-related deaths: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-329-gaza-strip
WHO, July 27, 2025, malnutrition-related deaths: https://www.who.int/philippines/news/detail-global/27-07-2025-malnutrition-rates-reach-alarming-levels-in-gaza–who-warns
WHO and UNICEF, November 6, 2024 second-round polio campaign report: https://www.who.int/news/item/06-11-2024-second-round-of-polio-campaign-in-gaza-completed-amid-ongoing-conflict-and-attacks–unicef-and-who
ICC, November 21, 2024 arrest warrants and findings (reproduced by the United Nations): https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icc-arrest-warrant-netanyahu-21nov24/
UNFPA, birth and newborn-health data for January–June 2025: https://palestine.unfpa.org/en/news/unfpa-warns-catastrophic-birth-outcomes-gaza-amid-starvation-psychological-trauma-and
IPC, December 2025 food security assessment: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159820/
IPC, July 23, 2026 food security assessment: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1165303/
UN2720, June 2025 aid-tracking infographic and definition of interception: https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Monthly-InfographicJune.pdf
OCHA, Gaza Humanitarian Response Update, June 22–July 5, 2025 (51 percent recovered): https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-22-june-5-july-2025
Reuters, July 25, 2025 reporting on USAID's unpublished 156-incident analysis: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/usaid-analysis-found-no-evidence-massive-hamas-theft-gaza-aid-2025-07-25/
ICRC, starvation as a prohibited method of warfare: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2024/10/17/ihl-and-the-challenge-of-maintaining-food-security-in-armed-conflict/