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Before We Call Gaza a Genocide

The Peace Palace in The Hague, headquarters of the International Court of Justice

Part 1 of Is Israel Committing Genocide in Gaza?

Series note: This series examines the genocide allegation specifically. It does not presume that Israel's conduct during the war was lawful.

The word genocide carries a weight that few other accusations do. That is exactly why we should be careful with it.

Gaza has been devastated. Large numbers of Palestinian civilians have been killed, entire neighborhoods have been destroyed, and hospitals have been damaged or forced out of service. Food, water, sanitation, and much of ordinary civilian life have broken down. There is serious evidence warranting investigation of war crimes and other grave international crimes. We do not have to deny any of that to ask whether genocide is the correct description.

I think the care we take with that accusation should increase with the gravity of the suffering. If we are going to use the word genocide, we ought to be able to explain what separates it from other atrocities and show how the evidence meets that standard. Otherwise, the label risks becoming a measure of our horror instead of a judgment about the conduct and intent involved.

Genocide is not simply a very bad war

The 1948 Genocide Convention identifies five kinds of acts that can constitute genocide: killing members of a protected group; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent births; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The Convention also requires a particular intent: to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part, as such. International courts have explained that the targeted part must be substantial. The acts and that specific intent have to be examined together.

A military can unlawfully kill civilians without committing genocide. A government can torture detainees, starve civilians, or forcibly displace a population without necessarily possessing an intent to destroy the protected group. These acts may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, depending on the circumstances and the applicable legal elements. They do not become less serious because the label genocide has not been established.

Why the legal categories matter

Sometimes this is dismissed as legal hair-splitting. I do not think it is. If every sufficiently destructive war becomes genocide, we lose the ability to distinguish crimes committed through unlawful attacks, punishment, or forced removal from a campaign intended to destroy a people. We also risk reasoning backward from the consequences: the destruction is horrific, therefore the intention behind it must have been genocidal.

There is an equally serious mistake in the other direction. Israel cannot invoke the goal of defeating Hamas and thereby make the civilian consequences disappear. A military objective does not authorize indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, torture, collective punishment, starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, or unlawful forcible displacement. An operation can pursue a legitimate target and still be conducted unlawfully.

The legal proceedings need to be described with the same care. The International Court of Justice's provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel did not determine that Israel committed genocide. They also did not reject the allegation. The case had not reached a final merits judgment as of November 2026. Meanwhile, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded in September 2025 that Israeli authorities and forces had committed genocide in Gaza and reiterated its finding in October 2026. That is a consequential investigative conclusion, even though it is not a judgment of the ICJ. Its reasoning deserves to be examined seriously, along with the evidence and objections to it.

The hardest part is proving intent

Genocidal intent does not require a signed document saying, "We intend to commit genocide." Governments rarely produce evidence that conveniently. Intent can be inferred from statements, policies, and patterns of conduct. Official rhetoric matters. So do siege policies, targeting practices, restrictions on humanitarian aid, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and what happens to people after they are displaced.

But inference has to be disciplined. In its earlier genocide judgments, the ICJ held that when genocidal intent is inferred from a pattern of conduct, it must be the only reasonable inference from that pattern. This does not mean that an announced military purpose settles the question. The evidence may support more than one actual objective, and genocidal intent can coexist with military or political aims. The task is to determine which intentions the record supports.

A policy intended to pressure Hamas by making civilians suffer might constitute collective punishment or the unlawful use of starvation. A policy intended to push Palestinians out of Gaza might constitute forcible transfer and could form part of an ethnic-cleansing campaign. Either could also provide evidence of genocide, depending on its design, implementation, and intended consequences. The existence of another possible objective is not an automatic defense; nor does the severity of the consequences establish a purpose to destroy Palestinians without further examination.

The evidence has to be allowed to cut both ways

Some of the evidence is genuinely difficult for Israel. In October 2023, Yoav Gallant announced a complete siege of Gaza, while Ghassan Alian made statements about withholding essential supplies and the destruction that would follow. The cutoff of incoming humanitarian supplies in March–May 2025 deserves particularly close attention because the consequences of earlier restrictions were already well known. In August 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification concluded that famine was occurring in Gaza Governorate.

Reports of kill zones, permissive civilian-harm thresholds, and detention abuse warrant scrutiny. So do political calls for Palestinian emigration and the destruction of embryos and other reproductive material at the Al-Basma IVF Centre. A fair examination cannot simply wave away those facts or allegations. Their reliability, context, and connection to policy are part of the case we have to assess.

Evidence pointing in another direction also belongs in the record. Israel repeatedly identified Hamas as the military enemy. That stated goal is relevant, although the actual orders and conduct must be tested against it. Hostage negotiations affected military operations and humanitarian access. Aid flows increased during some periods, water access was partly restored, and humanitarian pauses took place. In September 2024, a coordinated polio-vaccination campaign reached approximately 559,000 children in its first round, with agreed pauses in fighting. During the January 2025 ceasefire, hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians returned toward northern Gaza.

None of those measures makes genocidal intent impossible. Some were negotiated under international pressure, and access in one period does not erase deprivation in another. Still, an argument built from the overall pattern of conduct must account for the whole pattern, including facts that complicate its preferred conclusion. That rule applies to my own position as much as to the case against Israel.

Why I will compare Gaza with other wars

Gaza is often described as uniquely destructive, and there are features of this war that deserve particular attention. But urban destruction and civilian death have occurred on an enormous scale in campaigns whose declared objective was to defeat an armed organization rather than destroy the civilian population as a protected group. The battles for Mosul and Raqqa, fought against ISIS, devastated neighborhoods and resulted in serious allegations of unlawful attacks. Those comparisons cannot acquit Israel. They do show why the scale of destruction alone cannot settle the question of intent.

The conditions in Gaza also differ sharply from those other battles. The territory is densely populated, Hamas operated a tunnel network in and around populated areas, hostages were held inside Gaza, and fighting returned to places damaged by earlier operations. Civilian infrastructure deteriorated as the conflict continued. The comparison also has to account for the length of the campaign and the restrictions governing movement, imports, and humanitarian relief; those features may substantially affect the legal assessment.

Most Gazan civilians could not leave the wider theater of war. Egypt rejected mass displacement into Sinai, and Israel restricted external movement as well. Civilians could be ordered away from a particular battlefield without being able to escape the war itself. Israel, meanwhile, had missile defenses, warning systems, shelters, and opportunities for civilian relocation that Gazans lacked. Those differences affect casualty patterns and the practical meaning of an evacuation order. They can explain some of the civilian danger without genocidal intent, while also making the protection of civilians a more demanding obligation for the attacking force.

What this series will actually test

When a strike kills civilians, I want to know what was targeted, what the attacker knew, whether civilian harm was expected to be excessive, and whether the civilians themselves were intended targets. The civilian death toll is indispensable evidence, but the circumstances of an attack tell us more about which laws may have been violated and why.

Restrictions on food, water, fuel, and medicine raise a different set of questions. Were the restrictions designed to prevent supplies from reaching Hamas, pressure its leadership, punish the wider population, drive civilians from an area, or bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians? We have to examine the actual policy and its foreseeable consequences, including how it changed over time. A stated rationale is part of the evidence; implementation may tell a different story.

Displacement presents similar problems. What did an evacuation order ask civilians to do? Could they travel safely? Was there anywhere safer to go? Were they permitted to return, and under what conditions? Calls for permanent Palestinian emigration have to be distinguished from specific battlefield evacuation orders, although the two may be connected in practice. With extreme official statements, we also need to ask who made them, what authority they had, the context of their words, and whether the statements corresponded to decisions on the ground.

These questions are less dramatic than declaring every new incident proof for one side. They are also more useful.

What would change my conclusion

I want to state at the outset what could change my assessment. Credible orders, internal records, or a demonstrated policy showing that Israeli decision-makers intended to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, in whole or in substantial part, would be powerful evidence. So would proof that attacks on nominal military targets were deliberately used as a pretext to kill Palestinian civilians because they belonged to the protected group.

Evidence that restrictions on food, water, or medicine were imposed with the purpose of bringing about the group's physical destruction would substantially change the analysis. If the Al-Basma IVF Centre was deliberately attacked to prevent Palestinian births, that would bear directly on an act specified in the Convention. A documented policy effectively forcing people to leave or face intended physical destruction would be similarly consequential. None of these possibilities requires a public confession of intent; a convincing pattern of decisions and conduct can be enough.

Evidence in the other direction must receive the same treatment. Reliable targeting records, credible distinctions between combatants and civilians, records of meaningful investigations into unlawful killings, or evidence resolving disputed incidents may weaken particular allegations. Such evidence would not automatically resolve the broader genocide question, but I cannot set a standard for others and exempt my own conclusion from it.

Where we begin

I do not regard Israel as innocent of serious crimes merely because I am unconvinced, at this stage, that the specific genocidal intent has been established. The scale of civilian suffering and the evidence of possible unlawful conduct demand a serious accounting in their own right. At the same time, I am not prepared to let the scale of that suffering decide an allegation whose legal meaning includes the purpose behind the acts.

There are now serious findings and arguments on both sides of this question. In the next article, I will examine the strongest case that Israel has committed genocide, including the evidence that presents the greatest difficulty for my present assessment. That case deserves to be heard before I test whether it carries the conclusion being drawn from it.

Sources and legal framework

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II (1948).

International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment (2007), particularly paragraph 373 on specific intent and inference from conduct.

International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment (2015), particularly paragraphs 145–148 and 510–514.

International Court of Justice, South Africa v. Israel, Order of 26 January 2024 (summary), and subsequent provisional-measures orders. These are not a final judgment on the merits.

International Court of Justice, South Africa v. Israel, Order of 21 May 2026, setting the next pleading deadlines.

UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Legal Analysis of the Conduct of Israel in Gaza (A/HRC/60/CRP.3), September 2025.

UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Report to the General Assembly (A/81/430), October 2026.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Gaza Strip analysis, August 2025.

World Health Organization, humanitarian blockade and food access, 23 July 2025.

World Health Organization, first round of the Gaza polio campaign, 13 September 2024.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gaza response, 19 January–1 February 2025.

Next in the series: The Strongest Case That Israel Is Committing Genocide.

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