Before the Conflict: What Palestine Actually Was, 1880–1914
When people argue about Israel and Palestine, they often turn to history in search of a decisive answer. Who was there first? Who had a claim to the land? Was Palestine already a nation, or was it an empty territory waiting to become one? These questions are understandable, but they can also lead us to imagine a past that looks suspiciously like the political arguments of the present.
To understand how the conflict developed, we need to examine the world that existed before it became a conflict between two national movements. Our starting point is 1880–1914, the last generation of Ottoman rule before the First World War. There was no state of Israel, and there was no independent Palestinian state. There was, however, a recognizable region with a long history, established communities, local institutions, and a social order already undergoing considerable change. Its inhabitants were not simply waiting for the events that would later define their history. They had lives of their own.
Two myths, both false
Two familiar accounts tend to dominate popular discussions of this period. In one, Palestine was a neglected, sparsely populated backwater until Jewish immigrants arrived and made the desert bloom. In the other, it was a prosperous and harmonious Arab homeland where Jews and Arabs lived peacefully until European Zionists arrived and destroyed that harmony.
Neither account survives close examination. Palestine was not empty, and its population was not living in an idyllic society free of religious or social divisions. It was a predominantly Arab region with a longstanding Jewish presence, considerable differences in wealth and status, and communities whose relationships ranged from cooperation to suspicion and, at times, violence. It was also changing before the first major wave of Zionist immigration began in 1882.
Rejecting both stories does not mean assigning equal responsibility for everything that followed, nor does it settle the competing claims that emerged. It means beginning with a more reliable picture of the people and institutions that were actually there. That is a better foundation for the history we want to understand.
A small land at the hinge of continents
Palestine lies along the eastern Mediterranean and covers, depending on how its boundaries are defined, roughly 10,000 square miles; somewhat larger than New Jersey. The Mediterranean lies to the west, the Jordan Valley and desert to the east, Lebanon to the north, and Sinai to the south. Within that relatively small area are coastal plains, cultivated highlands, the Jordan Valley, and the Negev desert. The valley descends to the lowest dry land on Earth, more than 400 meters below sea level.
Its historical importance was never a matter of size. This was a corridor between Africa and Asia, between Egypt and Mesopotamia, and between the Mediterranean world and the interior of the Middle East. Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arab dynasties, Crusaders, Mamluks, Ottomans, and eventually the British all exercised power over parts of the region. Its geography helped make it valuable to empires, while its religious associations made it important to people who had never set foot there.
The province that did not exist
The Ottoman Empire conquered the region from the Mamluks in 1516–17 and ruled it until the British advance in 1917. That is roughly four centuries of Ottoman rule. Yet there was no single Ottoman province officially called Palestine. Anyone looking at an Ottoman administrative map would find districts and provinces—sanjaks and vilayets—rather than a political unit with the boundaries of the later British Mandate.
In May 1872, Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha separated Jerusalem, Nablus, and Acre from the surrounding Ottoman administration. The arrangement was short-lived. Just two months later, Midhat Pasha reversed much of the decision, returning Acre and Nablus to Syria while Jerusalem remained a separate mutasarrifate, reporting directly to Istanbul.
There is some disagreement among historians about when this arrangement was formally established, with some placing it in 1872 and others in 1874. Regardless of the precise date, the distinction is important. The Ottoman Empire was reorganizing how it governed the region, and the administrative boundaries were not as fixed as modern discussions sometimes suggest.
Jerusalem’s special status reflected its religious importance and the attention of European governments, which claimed protective interests in particular churches, monasteries, and minority communities. To the north, Acre and Nablus belonged to the Syria Vilayet, administered from Damascus. In 1888, they were transferred with other coastal districts to the newly established Beirut Vilayet. Areas east of the Jordan, including Balqa, remained attached to Syria. The territory was administered in pieces, and those pieces did not remain fixed.
None of this means that the name Palestine was invented later. Greek writers used Palaistinē as early as Herodotus in the fifth century BC, and the Romans used Syria Palaestina as an official provincial name after the Bar Kokhba revolt in the second century AD. Arabic speakers used Filastin. Jews used Eretz Yisrael in religious and communal contexts, while also using Palestine or Filastin in other languages and settings. Ottoman documents sometimes used the regional name without treating it as a formal province.
What varied was the extent of the territory the name described. Palestine could overlap with Southern Syria, and its boundaries were not universally agreed upon. Even the Ottoman handbook Filastin Risalesi, published in 1915, described a region comprising Jerusalem, Nablus, and Acre. The name, in other words, had a long history even though it did not identify a single sovereign or consistently administered territory.
There is an important distinction here between the absence of an independent state and the absence of political life. Jerusalem had an elected municipal council from 1863. After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, representatives from the region sat in the Ottoman parliament. Arabic newspapers, including al-Karmil in Haifa and Filastin, founded in Jaffa in 1911, debated politics and the future of the region. Palestine had institutions, public arguments, and a developing political consciousness. What it did not have was an independent Palestinian government.
Who lived there?
Population figures are among the most contested parts of this history, partly because they are routinely pressed into service for modern political arguments. Ottoman records were imperfect, categories varied, and some inhabitants had reasons to avoid enumeration, including taxation, conscription, or questions about legal residence. Bedouin communities were especially difficult to count and were often underrepresented. The sensible approach is to use estimates, explain their limits, and resist the temptation to turn uncertain figures into exact ones.
Around 1880, the population was about 450,000. Justin McCarthy’s demographic work puts the non-Jewish population at roughly 453,000 in 1882, while Alexander Scholch’s estimate for 1850 gives a total of about 350,000. Scholch’s earlier breakdown was approximately 85 percent Muslim, 11 percent Christian, and 4 percent Jewish, proportions that had not changed dramatically by 1880. For the beginning of our period, a rough working picture is about 400,000 Muslim Arabs, 40,000 Christian Arabs, and 20,000–25,000 Jews. These are approximations, not three precisely measured groups that can simply be added to produce a definitive census total.
By 1914, the population had grown substantially, but scholars disagree about its size and composition. McCarthy estimates approximately 657,000 Muslims, 81,000 Christians, and 59,000 Jews, a total close to 800,000. Sergio DellaPergola, drawing on Roberto Bachi, offers a lower total of about 689,000, including roughly 525,000 Muslims, 70,000 Christians, and 94,000 Jews. The disagreement is especially striking in the Jewish estimates: 59,000 versus 94,000.
That difference reflects more than a dispute over arithmetic. One issue is whom the records counted. Many newer Jewish immigrants retained foreign citizenship and enjoyed some degree of European consular protection, complicating their treatment in Ottoman statistics. Another issue is how the underlying records are interpreted. Schmelz and DellaPergola have argued that McCarthy’s handling of Ottoman household records from 1868–69 seriously undercounts Jewish households. This is a genuine methodological disagreement, and readers are better served by seeing it than by being handed one number without explanation.
Even with those uncertainties, the broad pattern is clear. Arabs, overwhelmingly Muslim, made up the large majority of the population. The Jewish population grew considerably during the decades before the war, much of that increase coming through immigration, though established Jewish communities also grew. By 1914, Jews represented somewhere in the range of roughly 7 to 14 percent of the population, depending on which estimates one accepts.
The story does not move upward in a straight line. During the First World War, Ottoman deportations of Jews holding enemy-power citizenship, departures, famine, disease, and the disruption of ordinary life contributed to a decline in the Jewish population to around 56,000 by 1919. The war devastated communities across the region, not only one of them.
The Muslim Arab majority
The Arab majority was itself divided by class, occupation, and geography. At the upper end were the urban notable families, whose influence came from land, religious offices, commerce, and their relationships with Ottoman administrators. Jerusalem had the Husseinis, Nashashibis, Khalidis, Dajanis, Alamis, and Nusseibehs; Nablus had the Touqans and Abdul Hadis; Gaza had the Shawas. Some traced their ancestry to the Prophet’s companions, others to soldiers associated with Saladin. Their members served as muftis and judges, owned estates, held municipal or provincial office, and increasingly educated their sons in Istanbul, Beirut, and European cities.
Oren Kessler’s Palestine 1936 offers a useful glimpse of this world through the Alami family. Faidi al-Alami served as mayor of Jerusalem in the early twentieth century, while his son Musa would become an important figure under the British Mandate. Families of this standing lived in substantial homes, maintained libraries, and participated in commercial and political networks that extended far beyond Palestine. Calling the entire region a backward, isolated society overlooks the experience of these urban elites.
But those families were not representative of most people. The majority of Palestinian Arabs were fellahin, village farmers who cultivated wheat, barley, olives, figs, and grapes, as well as the citrus crops that were becoming increasingly important to coastal commerce. Many lived in modest stone houses, sometimes sharing space with livestock. Literacy was limited, and the demands of landlords and Ottoman tax collectors were part of ordinary life.
The land beneath their feet would become one of the central issues of the conflict. The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was intended to regularize ownership and taxation, but its implementation could concentrate registered titles in the hands of local notables and absentee landowners in cities such as Beirut and Damascus. Families who had cultivated land for generations did not necessarily hold the legal title to it. Decades later, some of those landowners were able to sell property while the people farming it had limited means of preventing the transaction. The distinction between working land and owning it legally would have profound consequences.
Outside the towns and settled villages were Bedouin communities, particularly in the Negev and parts of Galilee. Their lives followed different rhythms, shaped by herding, tribal relationships, and seasonal movement. Ottoman authority reached them unevenly. Any account that treats the Arab population as a single, uniform community misses these differences.
The Christian Arabs
Christian Arabs are often pushed to the margins of popular accounts, as though the conflict involved only Muslims and Jews. Yet they were an important part of the region’s religious, educational, and political life. Arabic-speaking Christians belonged to Greek Orthodox, Melkite, Latin Catholic, and Protestant communities, while the wider Christian population also included Armenian, Coptic, and Syriac congregations. Christian communities were especially prominent in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Ramallah, and Haifa.
Christians were disproportionately represented in urban trades, education, and the professions. Mission schools and European connections opened opportunities to learn foreign languages and participate in commercial and intellectual networks. European powers, meanwhile, asserted protective roles over different Christian denominations, adding another layer to local politics.
This background helps explain why Christians played such a visible role in the early development of Arab nationalism. A political identity built around language and a shared homeland, rather than religious membership alone, offered a way to imagine a community that included Muslims and Christians. The emergence of Arab nationalism cannot be reduced to religion, and the Christian contribution is one reason why.
The Jewish community
The Jewish population was no more uniform than the Arab majority. Long-established communities had different languages and histories; Jews had arrived from elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire; religious immigrants came from Europe; and, increasingly, settlers were motivated in part by modern Jewish nationalism.
Among the older communities were the Musta’arabim, Arabic-speaking Jews with deep roots in the region, and Sephardi Jews whose ancestors had been expelled from Spain in 1492 and settled across the Ottoman world. Other Jewish families came from Yemen, Iraq, Persia, Kurdistan, and North Africa. Depending on their background, people spoke Arabic, Judeo-Arabic, Ladino, and other languages. Many were Ottoman subjects, dressed in regional styles, and shared aspects of everyday culture with their Muslim and Christian neighbors.
Jewish religious life was particularly associated with Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias, traditionally known as the Four Holy Cities. Many immigrants came to pray, study, or spend their final years in the Holy Land. Much of this older religious world was oriented toward the hope of divine redemption rather than an immediate campaign for Jewish political sovereignty. Hebrew remained central to prayer, scholarship, and sacred texts; it had not disappeared merely because everyday conversation often took place in other languages.
Ashkenazi Jews from Eastern and Central Europe had also established communities before 1880. Some depended heavily on the halukka, charitable contributions gathered from Jewish communities abroad. Their presence is another reminder that the division between an entirely indigenous Jewish population and an entirely new European one is too simple.
Beginning in 1882, the First Aliyah brought a different kind of immigration into sharper view. Many of its participants came from Eastern Europe after the pogroms that followed the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. Some were associated with Hovevei Zion, or Lovers of Zion, and were drawn by a combination of refuge, attachment to the land, and emerging national ambitions. They established agricultural settlements such as Rishon LeZion, Zikhron Ya’akov, and Rosh Pinna. Early conditions were difficult, and several settlements became heavily dependent on Baron Edmond de Rothschild’s support. Ottoman authorities recognized the political implications of this immigration and attempted to restrict it.
The distinction we need to preserve is not between Jews who belonged and Jews who did not. It is between different communities, different migrations, and different understandings of what a Jewish future in the land should look like. A centuries-old religious attachment to the region was not identical to the modern political program of Zionism, even though the two could overlap. If we collapse them into a single story, we lose sight of an important part of what changed after 1882.
How they lived together
So what were relations between these communities actually like? Here, too, the answers are less tidy than either the story of permanent harmony or the story of permanent hostility.
The Ottoman Empire governed a religiously diverse population through institutions commonly described in terms of the millet system. Recognized religious communities exercised varying degrees of authority over worship, education, marriage, and other internal affairs. Yet this was not a system of equal citizenship in its older form. Islam occupied a privileged position in the empire, and Christians and Jews historically lived under the subordinate but protected status associated with dhimmi communities. Legal restrictions and special taxes reflected that hierarchy.
That does not mean Ottoman rule resembled the worst episodes of European persecution. Jewish refugees expelled from Spain in 1492 found homes in Ottoman lands, a striking contrast with the policies of the Spanish monarchy. A story later attributed to Sultan Bayezid II has him mocking Ferdinand for impoverishing Spain while enriching the Ottoman Empire. The remark may be a later legend, but the reception of many Sephardi refugees was real. Even so, it would be a mistake to turn the empire into a model of religious equality. Restrictions, discrimination, episodes of forced conversion, expulsions, and violence also belong to its history.
By the nineteenth century, the legal situation was changing. The Tanzimat reforms, especially the imperial edicts of 1839 and 1856, set out a principle of greater equality among Ottoman subjects. The jizya was abolished in 1855 and replaced by the bedel-i askeri, a payment associated with exemption from military service. These reforms altered the older legal hierarchy, but they did not erase social distinctions overnight. In some places, the loss of formal Muslim privilege generated resentment. The society into which political Zionism emerged was already negotiating the consequences of Ottoman reform.
Nor had the preceding decades been free of violence. During the 1834 revolt against Egyptian rule, Jewish communities in Safed and Hebron suffered attacks. The Damascus Affair of 1840, outside Palestine but within the wider region, showed how dangerous the blood libel—the false charge that Jews murdered Christian children for religious purposes—could become. Such accusations often circulated through Christian communities and could bring intervention by Ottoman officials and foreign governments.
But episodes of violence tell only part of the story. In ordinary life, neighbors traded, spoke one another’s languages, and sometimes participated in one another’s celebrations. Religious boundaries remained important, and marriage across them was rare. Yet people could be separated by law or communal identity while still knowing one another well. Jerusalem’s Muslim, Christian, Armenian, and Jewish quarters were distinct, but they were also close enough to walk between in minutes. Shared streets and markets made complete separation impossible.
The foster brothers
One story in Kessler’s account captures that more personal side of life. In some Jerusalem neighborhoods, when two women gave birth around the same time, a midwife might arrange for each to nurse the other’s child. The boys became milk-brothers, a relationship recognized in Islamic law and capable of creating lasting obligations between families. The families might visit, exchange gifts, and attend one another’s celebrations. Musa Alami, who later became a prominent Palestinian statesman, reportedly had a Jewish milk-brother.
We should not turn an anecdote into proof that the whole society lived in harmony. It did not. Legal inequality, communal suspicion, and outbreaks of violence were real. Yet the story reminds us of something that disappears when we tell the past only as a prelude to war: these were neighbors, not simply representatives of future national causes. Some had relationships that crossed the very divisions later hardened by politics.
The development of Jewish and Arab national movements made such relationships more difficult to sustain, especially as land, immigration, and political authority became matters of collective struggle. That change cannot be explained by either movement alone, nor should we pretend that everyone experienced it in the same way. My judgment is that both national movements carried claims worth understanding, but recognizing those claims does not settle the question of what each movement did, or what responsibility its leaders bore, as the conflict unfolded.
The sacred land
There is one more part of this history we cannot treat as an afterthought: religion. The land was not simply territory that two emerging national movements happened to want. For Jews, Muslims, and Christians, particular places carried meanings that went far beyond ordinary political geography.
For Jews, attachment to the land is woven through the Hebrew Bible and centuries of religious practice. The story repeatedly returns to promise, exile, return, loss, and the hope of restoration. Jewish prayers have long been oriented toward Jerusalem, and the Passover liturgy preserves the hope expressed in the words, “Next year in Jerusalem.” At many Jewish weddings, the breaking of a glass recalls the destruction of the Temple. Political independence might have seemed remote for much of that history, but attachment to Jerusalem and the land did not disappear.
The Temple Mount is central to that attachment. The First Temple stood there until its destruction by the Babylonians in 586 BC; the Second Temple was destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD. Access and residence were restricted in different ways under Roman rule, particularly after the Bar Kokhba revolt of 132–135 AD, when Hadrian refounded Jerusalem as Aelia Capitolina. Later rabbinic restrictions on entering the Temple Mount because of ritual impurity became influential in Jewish practice and continue among many Orthodox authorities today.
The Western Wall, part of the retaining structure around the Herodian Temple platform, became a major place of Jewish prayer and mourning. European observers often called it the Wailing Wall. Other sites also mattered deeply: Hebron, associated with the burial of Abraham and the patriarchs; Rachel’s Tomb near Bethlehem; and Safed and Tiberias, centers of Jewish scholarship and religious life.
For Muslims, Jerusalem is al-Quds, the Holy City, traditionally regarded as Islam’s third holiest city after Mecca and Medina. The Haram al-Sharif, or Noble Sanctuary, occupies the same elevated platform Jews call the Temple Mount. In Islamic tradition, Muhammad’s Night Journey and Ascension are associated with this place: his journey to the farthest mosque, his ascent to heaven, and his encounter with earlier prophets. Jerusalem also served as the first qibla, the direction of prayer, before the orientation shifted to Mecca.
The Dome of the Rock was completed in 691–92 under the Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik, while the early monumental Al-Aqsa Mosque is associated with al-Walid I in the opening decades of the eighth century. Much of the present Al-Aqsa building reflects reconstruction after later earthquakes, particularly under the Fatimids. The Dome of the Rock remains one of the great surviving monuments of early Islamic architecture. Hebron, too, is holy in Islam: the Ibrahimi Mosque honors Abraham, or Ibrahim, whom Muslims revere as a prophet.
What matters for our purposes is that some of the most revered places in the region are sacred to more than one community. A single platform in Jerusalem carries different, deeply rooted religious meanings for Jews and Muslims. The same is true, in another form, at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. These overlapping attachments are not incidental to the conflict. They help explain why seemingly small disputes over access, prayer, or the status of a building can become matters of enormous consequence.
For Christians, the geography follows the life of Jesus: Bethlehem and the Nativity, Nazareth and his childhood, Galilee and his ministry, Jerusalem and the Passion. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher, traditionally associated with the Crucifixion and Resurrection, is shared among several Christian communities under a longstanding set of arrangements known as the Status Quo. Ottoman decrees in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped formalize rules intended to prevent competing churches from changing the shared space unilaterally.
The famous ladder beneath one of the church’s windows illustrates how intricate those rules became. Visible in nineteenth-century images, it has remained in place because alterations to shared property could provoke disputes over authority. The church’s doors provide another remarkable example of religious coexistence shaped by practical compromise: two Muslim families, the Joudehs and the Nuseibehs, have traditional roles in safeguarding the key and opening and closing the entrance. Accounts differ about when these arrangements began, with traditions reaching back to the Muslim conquest or Saladin’s recovery of Jerusalem and later details attributed to the Ottoman era. The uncertainty about the origins should not obscure the longevity of the custom.
Why this matters
These sacred places will return throughout our history because their religious importance gave local disputes a significance far beyond the immediate incident. When we reach the violence of 1929, we will encounter controversies surrounding practices at the Western Wall, including disputes over a screen and other objects used during prayer. Those disagreements did not explain the violence by themselves, but they became part of a much larger confrontation over rights, sovereignty, and fear of what the other community intended.
The same caution will matter when we reach the Second Intifada. Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, became an important flashpoint, but saying that the visit alone caused the uprising would overstate the evidence. The Mitchell Committee concluded that it did not cause the uprising, while also describing it as ill-timed and provocative. Other accounts place greater weight on prior planning and the wider political crisis. The point is not that one walk inevitably set off a war. It is that the location made an already tense political act extraordinarily consequential.
Religious sites are not merely symbols to those who revere them. They are places where history, identity, and the sacred meet. Anyone trying to understand the conflict has to take those attachments seriously, even while distinguishing religious conviction from historical evidence and political entitlement.
Where we stand
We began with two familiar pictures of Ottoman Palestine: an empty land awaiting development and a peaceful homeland whose harmony was suddenly broken. Neither does justice to what was there. Around 1880, this was a region of roughly 450,000 people, predominantly Arab and Muslim, with Christian Arab communities and diverse Jewish populations. By 1914, its population had grown substantially. It had villages and cities, wealthy notables and poor farmers, religious institutions and municipal politics, local attachments and connections to an empire that was trying to reform itself.
It was neither a sovereign Palestinian state nor a land without a name, people, or institutions. It was neither a paradise of coexistence nor a place defined entirely by religious hostility. Communities lived within unequal structures, sometimes clashed, and often depended on one another in ordinary ways. The political movements that rose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries entered this complicated world. They did not create every tension within it, but they changed the terms on which its inhabitants would struggle over land and power.
The Jewish national movement drew on longstanding religious attachments while developing into a modern political program, particularly in Europe. Arab nationalism was also taking shape across the late Ottoman world, and in Palestine it developed in conversation with the local realities of immigration, land ownership, political reform, and competing claims. Neither movement is adequately explained as a simple reaction to the other. Understanding how they developed is the task of the next part of the series.
We will begin with Theodor Herzl and a story that has become almost inseparable from his name. According to the familiar account, Herzl watched the public degradation of Alfred Dreyfus in Paris in January 1895 and realized that Jews needed a state of their own. Herzl did report on Dreyfus’s humiliation for the Neue Freie Presse on January 5, 1895. But whether that event was the decisive moment of his conversion to Zionism is another question. Historians, notably Jacques Kornberg, have compared the later story with what Herzl was writing at the time and found good reason to doubt the tidy version.
That is where we will go next. Having examined the myths that obscure the land, we can turn to the myths that obscure the movement that sought to transform its political future.