|

Death, Targeting, and the Problem of Urban War

Palestinians inspect the ruins of a destroyed tower in Gaza City.

Part 3 of Is Israel Committing Genocide in Gaza?

The death toll is not the argument I want to have

A great deal of the argument over Gaza begins with the number of Palestinians killed and never gets much further. Some critics dismiss the Gaza Ministry of Health's figures because Hamas governs Gaza. Others treat the reported toll as though it were a count of civilians.

Independent mortality research gives us substantial reasons to accept the broad scale of Palestinian deaths. I see no reason to deny the scale of the killing in order to question whether the war was genocide. The question is how Israel conducted its attacks: how targets were chosen, what commanders knew about civilians at risk, and what happened when those decisions were carried out.

A death count is not a civilian count

In theUN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' November 4, 2026 snapshot, the Gaza Ministry of Health's 74,237 fully identified deaths included 35,555 men aged 18 to 59, 21,976 children (ages 0–17), 11,301 women aged 18 to 59, and 5,405 people aged 60 or older. Adult men formed the largest single category. Women and children together accounted for approximately 45 percent of the identified deaths.

We cannot simply count the adult men as fighters or assume that every woman and minor was a civilian. TheU.S. State Department reported that Palestinian armed groups organized military-training camps for children and that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were alleged to have recruited minors. Recruitment alone does not make a child a lawful target.

Israeli authorities have repeatedly estimated how many Hamas and other armed-group members were killed, but they have not released enough information for outsiders to reconstruct those figures independently. Attempts to calculate civilian deaths by subtracting a partial list of individually identified militants from the overall death toll are equally problematic. Such calculations assume that the list includes nearly every fighter killed, something that has not been established. Neither approach gives us a reliable civilian-to-combatant ratio.

Reading the casualty records

In May 2024, a change in how the UN presented Gaza's casualty figures prompted claims that thousands of children's deaths had been fabricated. Earlier UN reports had cited the Gaza Government Media Office's estimate of more than 14,000 children killed.On May 13, OCHA reported 7,797 children among the 24,686 deaths for which the Ministry of Health had collected full identifying details, while the ministry's overall reported death toll stood at 35,091. The smaller figure represented a subset of identified victims, with the identification process still underway. Questions about duplicate entries, incorrect ages, and subsequent revisions remain legitimate, but the change in the UN's presentation did not establish that thousands of previously reported deaths had been invented.

In 2025,Zeina Jamaluddine and colleagues published a capture–recapture analysis in The Lancet, estimating 64,260 deaths from traumatic injuries between October 7, 2023, and June 30, 2024, with a 95 percent confidence interval of 55,298 to 78,525. Their estimate was substantially higher than the ministry's recorded toll for the same period. A population-based survey of 2,000 households byMichael Spagat and colleagues, published in The Lancet Global Health in 2026, estimated 75,200 violent deaths through January 5, 2025, with a confidence interval of 63,600 to 86,800. That study also estimated nonviolent deaths and excess mortality separately. Although the studies employed different methods and covered different periods, both indicated that the ministry had substantially undercounted violent deaths during the periods examined.

Why the ratio cannot settle genocide

Even a reliable civilian-to-combatant ratio could not tell us whether particular attacks were lawful. Civilians may die in attacks on legitimate military targets, through indiscriminate fire, because of faulty intelligence or inadequate precautions, or in deliberate attacks on civilians. Some of those circumstances can amount to war crimes, and a pattern of unlawful attacks may also be relevant to an allegation of genocide.

International humanitarian law requires armed forces to distinguish civilians from lawful targets, take feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm, and refrain from attacks in which expected civilian losses would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Genocide requires something further: the specific intent to destroy Palestinians, in whole or in part, as a protected group. That intent may be inferred from conduct when the evidence warrants it. An explicit written order is not required.

Lavender and the limits of automated intelligence

In April 2024,Yuval Abraham reported for +972 Magazine and Local Call on Lavender, a system that six Israeli intelligence sources said assessed Palestinians for possible membership in the military wings of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to those sources, as many as 37,000 people were flagged at one point, and officers in the early weeks of the war sometimes accepted the classifications with minimal scrutiny. One officer said he normally spent about twenty seconds reviewing a proposed target, mainly to confirm that the person was male.

The sources also described an internal check of several hundred classifications that reportedly found about 90 percent accuracy in identifying Hamas affiliation. That category is broader than combatant status, and the reporting included examples of people allegedly flagged in error, including militants' relatives, police officers, and civil-defense workers.

TheIDF disputes the alleged use of Lavender as a target-selection system. It describes Lavender as a database that organizes and cross-references existing intelligence. Under its procedures, a human analyst must independently identify a lawful target, an intelligence officer must approve the designation, and a commander decides whether to carry out a strike. A later New York Times investigation cited three officers who said personnel in certain units treated a Lavender listing as sufficient to classify someone as a militant. The IDFresponded that it knew of no such practice, that it would violate its procedures, and that the officers might not have been aware of subsequent reviews.

Where's Daddy? and the decision to strike homes

The same investigation described a program called Where's Daddy?, which the sources said tracked suspected militants and alerted officers when they returned to their family homes. They alleged that homes were sometimes chosen for strikes because those individuals were easier to locate there than during fighting. Three sources described an incident in which a house was bombed although the intended target was no longer inside. Two others claimed that, in the war's opening weeks, attacks against some lower-ranking Hamas operatives could be approved even when 15 or 20 civilian deaths were anticipated.

A December 2024New York Times investigation, summarized by Reuters reported that mid-ranking Israeli officers were given broader authority to authorize strikes involving significant civilian risk. The IDF acknowledged changing its approval procedures after October 7, citing the need to respond quickly to the Hamas assault and continuing threats. It rejected the suggestion that casualty thresholds amounted to blanket permission to kill a specified number of civilians. In itsdetailed response, the IDF said the thresholds determined which level of command had to approve a strike, while every attack still required an individual assessment of proportionality.

Kill zones and the classification of the dead

In December 2024,Haaretz reported accounts from Israeli soldiers and officers who served along the Netzarim corridor. They described informal boundaries that civilians may not have understood and that some soldiers themselves said were unclear. One soldier from Division 252 recounted shooting a boy he estimated to be about sixteen. He said intelligence later indicated the boy was not a Hamas operative, but a battalion commander still congratulated the troops for killing a terrorist. Other officers alleged that civilians killed after crossing restricted lines were subsequently counted as militants.

TheIDF responded to the allegations, saying that operations in the corridor followed approved orders, its strikes targeted military objectives, and suspected violations were investigated. The accounts concern particular deployments, especially Division 252, and the practice described would make some reported combatant counts unreliable.

White flags and the three Israeli hostages

On December 15, 2023, Israeli soldiers in Shejaiya killed three escaped hostages: Yotam Haim, Samer Talalka, and Alon Shamriz. TheIDF's investigation found that the men were shirtless and one waved a white flag, although the first soldier's view was limited. Two were shot, and the third fled into a building. About fifteen minutes later, he called for help in Hebrew. A commander ordered troops to hold fire, but two soldiers who had not heard the order over a nearby tank shot him as he emerged. The military concluded that the shootings should have been prevented.

The IDF inquiry also found that troops had heard Hebrew cries for help days earlier and dismissed them as a possible Hamas trap. Those cries, it later concluded, came from the hostages. Israel wanted these men returned alive. Their deaths cannot reasonably be explained by a policy to kill Palestinians, yet soldiers fired on people who posed no immediate threat.

Hind Rajab and the Rafah medics

On January 29, 2024, Israeli troops fired on a car carrying five-year-old Hind Rajab and six relatives in Gaza City. Five occupants were killed in the initial shooting. Hind and her cousin Layan Hamada survived and called the Palestine Red Crescent for help. After Layan's call ended, Hind remained on the line, pleading for someone to come. An ambulance was dispatched after its movement had been coordinated with Israeli authorities. Twelve days later, both girls were found dead in the car, and the two paramedics were found dead in their wrecked ambulance nearby. AWashington Post investigation found that the recorded gunfire and damage to the ambulance were consistent with Israeli weapons. In itsAugust 2026 account, the IDF acknowledged firing on the family car, saying it had approached an Israeli position despite a previously announced restriction on movement. Military prosecutors ordered a criminal investigation concerning alleged failures in coordinating the ambulance's movement.

On March 23, 2025, Israeli troops killed fifteen Palestinians in three shootings involving ambulances, a fire truck, and a UN vehicle near Rafah. Avideo recovered from one of the dead paramedics' phones showed marked emergency vehicles approaching with their lights flashing before the shooting began. This contradicted the IDF's initial claim that the vehicles had approached without emergency signals, an account the military later acknowledged was mistaken. In itsAugust 2026 review, the IDF described an operation against Hamas members and said six of those killed had been identified as belonging to Hamas. The review also acknowledged that troops subsequently crushed the vehicles and covered the bodies. Military prosecutors found reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct in the shootings and ordered a criminal investigation.

The World Central Kitchen convoy

On April 1, 2024, Israeli drone strikes killed seven World Central Kitchen workers traveling in three marked vehicles near Deir al-Balah. Their aid operation had been coordinated with Israeli authorities. Israeli personnel had seen armed men accompanying the contracted trucks transporting food, including one who fired his weapon into the air, and concluded that Hamas had seized the convoy. Australia'sreview by former air chief marshal Mark Binskin confirmed the presence of armed men associated with locally contracted security, although WCK's policy called for unarmed personnel. Binskin could not determine how they had become armed or whether any had connections to Hamas. The security vehicle separated from the WCK vehicles before the strikes. Although the WCK vehicles subsequently departed from their planned return route, Binskin found that the decision to attack had already been made before that deviation occurred.

TheIDF's investigation found that its personnel mistook the WCK vehicles for those carrying Hamas members and failed to follow strike procedures. Details of the approved mission had not reached the relevant commanders, and the rooftop WCK markings were not visible in the nighttime drone footage. After reviewing the unedited footage, Binskin concluded that the military had not knowingly targeted the aid workers. He assessed that mistaken identification likely caused the first death, while the subsequent attacks on the second and third vehicles violated the rules of engagement and killed the remaining six. Israel removed two officers from their positions and reprimanded three senior officers. InAugust 2026, Israeli military prosecutors decided that the evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct warranting an investigation.WCK rejected that conclusion and renewed its demand for an independent inquiry.

Hospitals and evidence of military use

At Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City,security footage released by the IDF showed armed Hamas members bringing hostages into the complex on October 7, 2023. Israeli troops later uncovered a tunnel beneath the hospital grounds, which journalists subsequently viewed. ADecember 2023 Washington Post investigation found that the publicly available evidence did not substantiate Israel's more extensive claims about a command center connected to multiple hospital buildings. In January 2024, American intelligence officials said they had information that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad had used Al-Shifa and sites beneath it to hold hostages, store weapons, and conduct command activities. The intelligence underlying that assessment was not made public.

In May 2025, Israeli forces struck the European Gaza Hospital compound in Khan Younis, forcing the hospital to close. Aninitial Israeli graphic purporting to show underground infrastructure mistakenly highlighted buildings outside the hospital, an error the IDF later acknowledged. In June, Israeli forces took foreign journalists into a tunnel they said ran beneath the hospital's emergency department. TheIDF reported that Hamas military commander Mohammed Sinwar and another senior commander had been killed in an underground command center there, and that Sinwar's remains had been identified through DNA testing.Reuters journalists saw the tunnel themselves, although the identification of the bodies and the precise military use of the underground rooms depended principally on information supplied by Israel.

In January 2026,Doctors Without Borders suspended noncritical services at Nasser Hospital after its staff encountered masked armed men, intimidation, arbitrary arrests of patients, and suspected movement of weapons. Inpatient and surgical care continued throughout the suspension, and the organization resumed its other services in April after security measures improved. Doctors Without Borders did not identify the armed men as Hamas members or report having witnessed an organized military command center at Nasser. It also acknowledged that police and security personnel may have legitimate roles in and around medical facilities, while insisting that weapons and intimidation be kept away from patient care.

Underinternational humanitarian law, hospitals retain special protection. A hospital used as an operational military base or weapons depot may lose that protection, but treating wounded combatants or having armed guards does not by itself meet that standard. Any attack must still comply with the applicable warning requirements, proportionality, and precautions to protect patients, medical personnel, and civilians. Following the fighting at Al-Shifa, anApril 2024 World Health Organization mission found the hospital largely destroyed and unable to function.

From individual failures to possible command responsibility

The incidents examined here involve different military units, periods, and kinds of evidence. The Lavender and Netzarim allegations rely heavily on accounts from military personnel, while the World Central Kitchen investigation documented failures in coordination and targeting. The Hind Rajab and Rafah incidents have led to criminal investigations. Recurring failures could indicate problems in intelligence standards, rules of engagement, or supervision, but these cases alone cannot establish a common policy across the military.

UnderArticle 28 of the Rome Statute, a military commander may be criminally responsible for crimes committed by forces under their effective control if they knew, or should have known under the circumstances, that those crimes were being or would be committed and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent them, stop them, or refer them to the proper authorities. Applying that standard would require evidence of the underlying crimes, who controlled the units involved, what information reached their commanders, and how those commanders responded.

Casualties depend partly on the ability to survive an attack

A population's means of protection strongly influence how many people die in an attack. Israel has layered air defenses, including Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow, along with warning systems, shelters, and an organized capacity to evacuate communities. Gaza had nothing comparable, and most Palestinians could not leave the territory. A rocket intercepted before reaching an Israeli city may kill no one, while an evacuated community can endure repeated attacks with relatively few casualties.

Hezbollah began firing across Israel's northern border on October 8, 2023. Israeli authorities evacuated many nearby communities, and according toIsrael's State Comptroller, more than 60,000 northern residents were eligible for government-supported relocation by July 2024. The comptroller also documented serious shortcomings in the government's response and prolonged uncertainty among displaced families. Palestinians in Gaza, meanwhile, were repeatedly displaced within a much smaller territory as homes, medical facilities, and places of refuge were destroyed. Evacuation warnings could sometimes reduce casualties, but their effectiveness depended on whether civilians could reach somewhere safer. Such warnings did not, by themselves, resolve the legal questions of proportionality or feasible precautions.

Mosul, Raqqa, and the problems of urban warfare

During the 2016–2017 battle for Mosul, Iraqi forces and a US-led coalition fought ISIS in a city containing hundreds of thousands of civilians. ISIS moved civilians into combat areas, prevented many from escaping, and used them as human shields. AnAmnesty International investigation also documented extensive civilian deaths from Iraqi and coalition attacks, including the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated neighborhoods. Amnesty concluded that some of those attacks appeared unlawful.

Raqqa offers a similar example. From June to October 2017, the US-led coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces fought to remove ISIS from the city, leaving entire neighborhoods devastated. A subsequentAmnesty International and Airwars investigation estimated that coalition air and artillery strikes killed more than 1,600 civilians. The findings drew on field investigations, witness testimony, and corroborated records, and the estimated toll was substantially higher than the coalition had acknowledged when the report appeared.

US Defense Secretary James Mattis described the campaign against ISIS as one of annihilation. In aMay 2017 briefing, he explained that the military intended to surround ISIS strongholds and prevent foreign fighters from escaping and regrouping. His stated target was the armed organization, and he emphasized that the rules of engagement and efforts to protect civilians remained in place. Israeli officials have likewise spoken of destroying Hamas, although some of the statements examined in the preceding article were considerably less clearly confined to that military objective.

Gaza was not Mosul or Raqqa

Raqqa was recaptured after roughly four months of fighting, while the battle for Mosul lasted about nine. Israel's campaign in Gaza continued far longer, with troops repeatedly returning to neighborhoods they had previously entered. Hamas maintained an extensive tunnel network and held Israeli hostages throughout the territory. ISIS had also fought from densely populated areas, but Gaza's limited escape routes and the repeated displacement of its civilians created additional dangers. Theinternational humanitarian law prohibition on human shields requires deliberate use of civilians to protect military objectives; the proximity of fighters or tunnels to civilians does not establish that offense by itself. Hamas nevertheless had an obligation,as far as feasible, to avoid placing military objectives in densely populated areas. As medical care, water, sanitation, food distribution, and shelter deteriorated, Israeli commanders also had to consider the growing civilian consequences of further operations, including attacks on otherwise lawful military targets.

The strongest counterargument

Those who conclude that Israel committed genocide argue that its conduct must be considered cumulatively. They cite broad target selection, repeated heavy civilian losses, destruction of housing and medical infrastructure, restrictions on essential supplies, and statements by senior Israeli officials. Their argument is that these decisions persisted despite foreseeable consequences severe enough to support an inference that destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian population was intended. A genuine military campaign against Hamas could have existed alongside such an intent, which would not require a written order.

Hamas's October 7 attack and continued military operations gave Israel substantial military objectives, including rocket-launching capabilities, tunnels, armed positions in populated areas, and the hostages held in Gaza. Israel also issued evacuation orders, coordinated some humanitarian access, negotiated over hostages, and took disciplinary action following certain deadly incidents. In September 2024, agreed humanitarian pauses enabledthe World Health Organization and its partners to vaccinate approximately 560,000 children against polio, although fighting subsequently disrupted part of the vaccination effort in northern Gaza.

InCroatia v. Serbia, the International Court of Justice held that when genocidal intent is inferred from a pattern of conduct, the intent to destroy a protected group must be the only reasonable inference from that pattern. That standard requires examination of the full record, including evidence that challenges one's preferred explanation. A hypothetical alternative unsupported by the evidence is insufficient.

Where I come down

I find credible allegations of permissive targeting practices, documented failures to identify targets correctly, and killings for which responsibility may extend beyond the soldiers who fired. I cannot accept that civilian losses of this kind were simply unavoidable in urban warfare. Much of the publicly described targeting system, however, was directed at suspected members of armed groups, military infrastructure, or perceived threats. The evidence examined here does not persuade me that Israel's targeting campaign was carried out with the intent to physically destroy Palestinians as a group. It leaves serious questions about how often commanders accepted excessive civilian harm, what they knew of recurring failures, and whether they acted to correct them.

The siege, restrictions on food and other necessities, and allegations of deliberate starvation concern political decisions that extended beyond individual attacks. Their purposes and consequences may provide a different kind of evidence about genocidal intent.

Source guide

Previous: The Strongest Case That Israel Is Committing Genocide.

Next: Siege, Hunger, and Famine in Gaza.

Similar Posts