The Strongest Case That Israel Is Committing Genocide
Part 2 of Is Israel Committing Genocide in Gaza?
Series note: This article examines the strongest evidence offered for genocide. The competing explanations will receive closer attention as the series continues.
On October 9, 2023, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced a “complete siege” of Gaza. Electricity, food, and fuel were among the supplies he said would be cut off. Two days earlier, Hamas had attacked Israel, massacring civilians and taking hostages. The Israeli government was responding to those attacks, but Gallant's order concerned a territory with more than two million inhabitants, most of whom had taken no part in them. Whatever the intended military effect, the restrictions would also reach Palestinian families, hospitals, and people already dependent on supplies from outside Gaza.
Gallant's announcement is one of the statements cited as evidence that Israel intended to destroy Palestinians in Gaza. The case also rests on what followed: thousands of civilians killed, repeated displacement, the collapse of healthcare and local food production, and restrictions on humanitarian supplies that continued or returned as the war went on. Taken together, those events pose a more difficult question than any isolated quotation: what did Israeli authorities intend their policies to accomplish, especially once the consequences for Gaza's civilian population were known?
What the death toll can tell us
Gaza's Ministry of Health operates under Hamas, and its published death lists have required corrections, including the removal of people who were alive or had died from causes unrelated to the fighting. A2025 study published in The Lancet used a statistical method known as capture–recapture to estimate 64,260 traumatic-injury deaths from October 7, 2023, through June 30, 2024, substantially more than the ministry had recorded for that period.
Abraham Wyner andLewi Stone and Tom Simpson have challenged aspects of the method and the claimed scale of missing deaths. A separatehousehold survey published in The Lancet Global Health in 2026 also estimated substantially more violent deaths than the contemporary official count, althoughits sampling has been challenged andthe authors have responded. The estimates differ, and the arguments over how to count deaths are substantial. Even the lower figures, though, describe a devastating loss of life.
How many of the dead were civilians is less certain. The ministry does not distinguish civilians from combatants, while Israel's public estimates of Hamas fighters killed lack enough supporting detail to settle the matter. Women, children, and older people are often used as a shorthand for civilians, although that approach misses civilian men and can misclassify some younger fighters.
Civilians may have been deliberately targeted, killed in indiscriminate or disproportionate strikes, caught in attacks on armed groups operating in dense neighborhoods, or killed through battlefield errors. Israel's missile defenses, shelters, and warning systems help explain some of the enormous disparity between Palestinian and Israeli wartime deaths.
The siege and the people it affected
Gallant accompanied hisOctober 9 announcement with the description “human animals.” In comments to soldiers the following day, he referred explicitly to Hamas fighters, which supports the interpretation that the phrase concerned the October 7 attackers. On October 9, however, it appeared alongside an order affecting Gaza's civilian population. TheUN Independent International Commission of Inquiry adopted the broader interpretation, concluding that his words would reasonably have been understood as referring to Gazans generally. It treated the remarks as evidence of genocidal intent and found that they amounted to public incitement to genocide.
Food, electricity, and fuel were used by Hamas, but they also sustained hospitals, water systems, and ordinary households. Restricting them could pressure Hamas while making civilians suffer for actions over which they had no control. Gallant had authority over military policy, and Israel imposed restrictions, although their extent and duration changed throughout the war.
Ghassan Alian, then head of COGAT, was more explicit in addressing the civilian population. In anOctober 10 video statement, he blamed Gaza residents for celebrating the attacks and warned that there would be no electricity or water, only destruction. COGAT was responsible for coordinating civilian and humanitarian matters involving Gaza. Alian's warning came from an official whose agency was involved in administering the restrictions, and his decision to address residents as well as Hamas leaders gave the statement a broader meaning than a threat directed solely at armed fighters.
What happened to the means of survival
Article II(c) of theGenocide Convention includes deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a protected group's physical destruction, in whole or in part. Gaza's damaged housing, unsafe water, collapsing healthcare, and lost agricultural production left civilians increasingly dependent on aid from outside. At the same time, damaged roads, military operations, and restrictions made supplies more difficult to deliver. Disease and malnutrition placed further demands on hospitals already struggling to treat the wounded.
Hospitals and medical treatment
TheWorld Health Organization reported in January 2025 that only about half of Gaza's 36 hospitals were partially operational. BySeptember 2026, 19 were functioning at least partially, and none were fully operational. The WHO's definition ofattacks on healthcare includes obstruction of services and threats alongside physical violence, so those incident totals cannot be used as a count of hospitals bombed.
WHO's September 2026 account described interrupted cancer treatment and dialysis, shortages affecting mothers and newborns, and serious gaps in specialist care. Patients who survived an explosion could still die when surgery, blood, antibiotics, or trained staff were unavailable.
Agriculture and outside supplies
Gaza's ability to feed itself deteriorated sharply. In August 2025, theFood and Agriculture Organization and UNOSAT reported that 98.5 percent of cropland was damaged, inaccessible, or both. That figure is sometimes repeated as though virtually every field had been physically destroyed, although the assessment included land farmers could not reach or cultivate because of military restrictions, danger, damaged irrigation, or a lack of fuel. A farmer could lose a growing season without losing the field itself. With so much land unavailable for cultivation, Gaza became still more dependent on food brought in from outside.
The famine chronology
In March 2024, famine was projected as imminent in northern Gaza. Access subsequently improved, and aJune 2024 Famine Review Committee assessment found that the evidence available at that point did not indicate famine was occurring. The committee still warned that food insecurity was severe and the risk of famine remained high.
In March 2025, after the first phase of the ceasefire ended, Israel again stopped humanitarian and commercial supplies entering Gaza. Some restrictions eased in May. In August 2025, theIntegrated Food Security Phase Classification found famine in Gaza Governorate, with reasonable evidence. After the October ceasefire and an improvement in access, aDecember assessment no longer classified any area of Gaza as experiencing famine, although severe hunger persisted.
I find the renewed restrictions in 2025 particularly difficult to dismiss. The government had received more than a year of warnings about what interruptions in supplies were doing to civilians, and it had seen conditions improve when access improved. What military or security objective justified imposing another broad cutoff with those consequences already known?
Ordered to leave, but where could people go?
Israel repeatedly instructed civilians to leave areas before or during military operations. Evacuation warnings can reduce casualties, but civilians must be able to act on them. In Gaza, that meant finding a passable route, a destination with shelter, food, water, and medical care, and some prospect that the designated area would remain outside the fighting. Families also had to consider whether they could ever return.
For many Palestinians, leaving Gaza altogether was impossible. Egypt resisted a mass movement into Sinai, partly because of concerns that temporary refuge would turn into permanent exile, while Israel also restricted departures. Within Gaza, evacuation routes were dangerous, destinations became overcrowded, and Israeli operations later reached places to which civilians had been directed. Families were sometimes told to move again after losing their homes, jobs, and access to medical treatment. A warning might have saved some lives without giving the displaced population a genuinely safe place to go.
As families were being displaced, influential Israeli ministers were discussing a Gaza with far fewer Palestinians. Bezalel Smotrich advocated encouraging emigration andenvisioned a Gaza with perhaps 100,000 to 200,000 Arabs instead of roughly two million. Itamar Ben-Gvir promoted emigration and renewed Israeli settlement, andother ministers attended a January 2024 conference devoted to those ideas. Other Israeli officials opposed resettlement, and the ministers' proposals were not automatically adopted as military policy. Still, the destruction of homes, repeated displacement, and loss of ordinary livelihoods could make permanent departure more likely, whether or not it was ordered.
The ministers' statements establish that some officials wanted Palestinians to leave Gaza. That objective most directly concerns forcible transfer or ethnic cleansing. It could overlap with genocide if officials intended to create conditions in which people must depart or face physical destruction, or if they intended to destroy those who remained.
How were targets selected?
In April 2024,+972 Magazine and Local Call published an investigation based on accounts from Israeli intelligence personnel. Their sources described the use of Lavender and related systems to identify large numbers of suspected Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives. They alleged that reviews of suggested targets could be cursory, that commanders accepted high levels of anticipated civilian harm for some strikes, and that suspects were sometimes attacked after returning home. The accounts, if accurate, describe commanders making decisions with extraordinary consequences for civilians on the basis of limited review.
TheIsraeli military disputes important parts of the report. It describes Lavender as a database used to organize and cross-reference intelligence, says the system did not independently select targets, and maintains that human analysts reviewed targets under military procedures and international law.
Other reports allege the existence of designated kill zones where people entering particular areas could be treated as combatants without adequate identification. If some of those killed were subsequently counted as militants, the casualty figures used to defend the operations would also be affected. The accounts still require corroboration tied to specific incidents and orders.
Detention and serious bodily or mental harm
AJuly 2024 report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, drawing on interviews with released prisoners and other evidence, described numerous allegations of abuse of Palestinian detainees. The accounts included beatings, stress positions, deprivation, sexual violence, and medical neglect. The report found recurring patterns, although the individual allegations had not all been adjudicated.
Article II(b) of the Genocide Convention includes causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a protected group. The treatment described by OHCHR could satisfy that element if established. The report does not itself establish that the abuse was carried out with an intention to destroy Palestinians as a group; punishment, revenge, or interrogation could also explain the conduct alleged.
The Al-Basma IVF Centre
In December 2023, a shell struck Gaza's Al-Basma IVF Centre, destroying thousands of embryos and other reproductive material stored there. TheUN Independent International Commission of Inquiry examined photographs and other evidence and concluded that the projectile was most probably fired from an Israeli tank. It found no credible evidence that the facility was being used for military purposes. On the basis of the apparent precision of the strike, the center's identification as a fertility clinic, and the pattern of damage, the Commission went further: it concluded that the facility had been intentionally attacked to prevent Palestinian births. That finding engages Article II(d) of the Genocide Convention, which concerns measures intended to prevent births within a protected group.
Israeli forces reportedly said they were unaware of the particular strike and denied intentionally targeting civilian facilities, including IVF clinics. The Commission inferred intent from the nature of the facility and its reconstruction of the attack; the public record does not contain the underlying Israeli targeting decision.
Reading the evidence together
TheUN Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded in September 2025 that Israeli authorities and security forces had committed genocide, andreaffirmed that conclusion in October 2026. The International Court of Justice has not issued a final judgment on the genocide allegation. Israel rejects it, pointing to its military objectives of defeating Hamas and returning the hostages.
The most troubling evidence, in my view, concerns the renewed restrictions on civilian supplies in March 2025. The government had extensive warnings about shortages, displacement, and the deterioration of Gaza's infrastructure, yet it again imposed a sweeping cutoff. Gallant's and Alian's earlier remarks give that decision an unsettling context, particularly when read alongside the government's knowledge of the civilian consequences.
I remain unconvinced that the available evidence establishes a specific intention to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, in whole or in substantial part, as such. The renewed restrictions in 2025 leave me with the hardest question: what did Israeli officials expect another cutoff to accomplish after more than a year of seeing its consequences for civilians? The decisions behind individual strikes may tell us even more about what officials were prepared to do, and why.
Sources and further reading
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II (1948).
The Lancet, capture–recapture study of traumatic-injury mortality (2025);Abraham Wyner's statistical response; andLewi Stone and Tom Simpson's research note.
The Lancet Global Health, Gaza Mortality Survey (2026);DellaPergola and Zlochin's published critique; andthe authors' response.
Sky News investigation of corrections to Gaza's official death lists, April 2025.
Yoav Gallant's October 9, 2023 siege announcement andGhassan Alian's October 10 statement (contemporaneous reporting).
UN Commission of Inquiry, report to the General Assembly (A/81/430), October 2026.
WHO, Gaza health system, January 2025,September 2026, anddefinition of attacks on healthcare.
FAO and UNOSAT, Gaza cropland assessment, August 2025.
IPC, Famine Review Committee assessment, June 2024;IPC, Gaza famine classification, August 2025; andWHO summary of December 2025 reassessment.
OHCHR, report on detention in the context of Gaza hostilities, July 2024.
+972 Magazine and Local Call, Lavender investigation, April 2024 andthe IDF's response.
Contemporary reporting onSmotrich's emigration proposal andthe January 2024 resettlement conference.
Previous: Before We Call Gaza a Genocide.
Next: Death, Targeting and the Problem of Urban War.